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What's in a Name? Not Much for
Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Weidner v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Equitable adoption is a doctrine which allows a child who was not adopted
with the statutory formalities to maintain a claim in equity to at least some of the
benefits that come with the status of a biological or legally adopted child.2
Before this Note develops the confusing nature of Missouri's equitable adoption
law in detail, it is best to understand how the cases arise and what, in general, is
confusing about them. Most of the cases in Missouri arise in the following
setting: a person other than the natural or legally adoptive parent raises a child;
this person passes away, and the child seeks a decree of equitable adoption so
that he can share in the estate of the deceased.' Generally, the heirs of the
deceased oppose the child because they stand to inherit a greater amount if the
court does not allow the child to receive any of the estate property.4 Missouri's
law in the area is both confusing and interesting in two ways. First, although the
courts reiterate the same language in each case and the evidence appears to be
similar from one case to the next, the outcomes of decisions vary.5 Secondly, the
courts use both contract and estoppel doctrines to arrive at their decisions but
apply neither uniformly and sometimes blend the doctrines.6 Weidner v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. is one case in a long line of cases that
raises the issue of what a party must show to obtain an equitable adoption.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Sandra Weidner (Weidner) was born to a single mother, Dorothy Hamblin
(Hamblin) in January 1946 in Watertown, New York.7 When Hamblin learned
that she was pregnant, she left her hometown of Syracuse for Watertown to save
1. 928 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
2. Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 772 (1984).
3. See infra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
7. Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401,402 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
1
Petri: Petri: What's in a Name--Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
her family embarrassment.8 Hamblin gave Weidner the fictitious surname
Carpenter.9
Almost two years after Weidner's birth, Hamblin married Loft. 0 Although
Lott and Hamblin petitioned to have Weidner's name changed to Lott, they did
not petition for adoption." Weidner lived with Hamblin and Lott until she
married. 2 It was undisputed that Weidner referred to Lott as her father and Lott
referred to Weidner as his daughter.13 Weidner testified that it was not until she
was thirty-four years old that Hamblin told her the true circumstances of her
birth.'4 Although Weidner claimed that Hamblin had told her that Lott was her
natural father, there was no evidence that prior to Weidner's birth, Lott and
Hamblin had any relationship or even lived in the same city."
Lott and Weidner's relationship grew more distant in later years.16 Lott
died in a car accident in 1990 and left no will." Weidner sued American Family
Mutual Insurance Company (American Family) under its underinsured liability
coverage. 8 In that suit, Weidner alleged she was Lott's daughter. 9 American
Family discovered Weidner was born nearly two years before Lott and Hamblin
married, and thus, alleged that Weidner was not Loft's natural born daughter and
that the couple had never adopted her.20 Weidner subsequently filed an action
for a declaration of adoptive status to confer standing on Weidner to pursue a






14. Weidner, 928 S.W.2d at 402.
15. Id.
16. Id. "Lott moved to Missouri following his retirement in 1979, and [Weidner]
testified that she had seen him only once since then. [Weidner] produced only three
letters between them from this period." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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wrongful death action under Missouri Revised Statutes § 537.080.2' The trial
court found Weidner to be the equitably adopted daughter of Lott.22
On appeal, American Family asserted that the trial court erred in finding
Weidner the equitably adopted daughter of Lott because the evidence was just
as consistent with a stepdaughter-stepfather relationship as with an adoptive
relationship.23 The court of appeals recognized that prior Missouri case law
included language indicating that, when a person takes a child into his own
home, assumes the status of a parent, and by reason thereof obtains from the
child affection, companionship, and services which ordinarily accrue to a parent,
he and those claiming through him are estopped to assert that he did not adopt
the child.24 However, the court also noted that prior Missouri case law indicated
that an equitable adoption will be granted only where justice, good faith, and
21. Id. Missouri Revised Statutes § 537.080 reads:
1. Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have
entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or party
who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued
shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured, which damages may be sued for:
(1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants
of any deceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or
illegitimate, or by the father or mother of the deceased, natural or
adoptive; .
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action,
then by the brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants,
who can establish his or her right to those damages set out in
section 537.090 because of the death;
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the
action, then by a plaintiff ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be
appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the action for
damages provided in this section upon application of some person
entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. Such plaintiff ad
litem shall be some suitable person competent to prosecute such
action and whose appointment is requested on behalf of those
persons entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. Such court
may, in its discretion, require that such plaintiff ad litem give bond
for the faithful performance of his duties.
2. Only one action may be brought under this section against any one
defendant for the death of any one person.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1994).
22. Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401,402 (1996). The
trial court also imposed Rule 55.03 sanctions on American Family for requesting a jury
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equity require it. In cases in which a stepchild is seeking equitable adoption
from a stepparent, courts have looked for evidence of more than a stepchild-
stepparent relationship, such as indicia of an intent or attempt to adopt.25
After stating the rigorous equitable adoption standard for stepchildren, the
court held that Weidner had not satisfied the standard because there was no
evidence indicating the relationship constituted anything more than a stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship. Also, considerable evidence showed that Lott did not
intend to adopt Weidner: such as Lott's failure to represent himself as the child's
father in the petition to change Weidner's name, his failure to adopt Weidner,
his listing his sister as his closest relative on his application for Veteran's
benefits, and his infrequent communication with Weidner after he retired. 6 In
closing, the court stated that it did not question the closeness of Lott and
Weidner's relationship, but it remained unconvinced that the closeness of the
relationship distinguished it from a stepdaughter-stepfather relationship."
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, with instructions to
amend the declaratory judgment to be consistent with the court of appeals'
decision.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Equitable Adoption in the Late 1800s and Early 1900s
Missouri courts long ago recognized the notion of adoption without meeting
the technical requirements of the adoption statutes.29 One of the earliest and
most cited cases to recognize this concept was Lynn v. Hockaday.0 In Lynn,
Lillie Hockaday (Hockaday) claimed to be the adopted daughter of the deceased
(Mr. Lynn), despite not having complied with the statutory method of adoption.3,
As the adopted daughter of Mr. Lynn, she sought a child's share in his estate.32
Mr. Lynn's natural son opposed Hockaday, claiming to be Mr. Lynn's only
heir.33
25. Id.
26. Id. at 404.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's decision on the Rule
55.03 sanctions. Id.
29. See, e.g., Sharky v. McDermitt, 4 S.W. 107, 112 (Mo. 1887).
30. 61 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1901).
31. Id. at 885. At the time, the statutory method of adoption was by deed of
adoption.
32. Id.
33. Id. In this case, the standard procedural posture of the case was reversed. The
suit was for the admeasurement of dower of the widow of James Lynn, intestate, in which
his son James F. Lynn claimed to be the only heir. However, by leave of the court, Lillie
Hockaday was made a party. She filed an answer and cross bill showing that she was in
[Vol. 63
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Hockaday's evidence showed that her natural grandmother had given her
to the Lynns, and that thereafter, the Lynns gave her their surname, referred to
her as their "daughter," reared her in the family as if she were their own child,
and consented to her marriage. 4 Evidence also existed that Hockaday was a
dutiful and loving daughter and referred to the Lynns as "mama" and "papa.
35
The parties contested whether Hockaday's grandmother and the Lynns
orally agreed that the Lynns were actually adopting Hockaday.36 However, the
supreme court mooted the issue by reasoning that the acts of Mr. Lynn were not
only consistent with the theory of adoption, but they were inconsistent with any
other theory.37 In the court's opinion, "acts spoke louder than words. 38 In
response, Mr. Lynn's son argued that, even if there were an agreement to adopt,
Hockaday's claim must fail because the agreement was within the statute of
frauds.39 However, the court reasoned that the statute of frauds was inapplicable
because the grandmother, the adopting parents, and the child had fully
performed the agreement, except for the execution of a formal deed.' The coiirt
refused to fault the child for the absence of a deed.4'
Finally, the court considered whether Hockaday had provided adequate
consideration, given that Hockaday enjoyed a wealthier home and more refined
rearing than she would have if she had remained with her grandmother. The
court stated:
[I]t does not follow as a legal conclusion that the reward was all on her side,
or even that it was her gain at all. That she took the place of an only daughter
in the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Lynn, and performed her part as such, is the cold
fact which the law regards as sufficient consideration to support the contract.
How much she added to their happiness the law does not undertake to
estimate.
42
The court then remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to enter a
decree declaring Hockaday to be a duly adopted child and heir at law of Mr.
Lynn.4
3
fact the adopted daughter of the intestate, even though no deed of adoption had been
executed. Id.
34. Id. at 886.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 886-88.
37. Id. at 888.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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There were many cases in the early 1900s in which the deciding court held
that the purported equitably adopted child had proved an oral contract by the
acts, admissions, and conduct of the parties after the foster parent had taken
custody of the child. 4 Schelp v. Mercantile Trust45 was an important case from
this time period because it was the first case to speak clearly of the theory of
adoption by estoppel in which no showing of an oral agreement was necessary. 6
Taylor v. Coberly47 is an excellent case to begin the analysis of equitable
adoption after Hockaday because the court reviewed the facts of the case in great
detail, because the facts are similar to those of later cases in Missouri, and
because the court based its holding alternatively on the oral contract and
estoppel theories of equitable adoption s Taylor represents one of the last cases
displaying an antiquated approach to equitable adoption, in which the court was
willing to infer a contract to adopt when the evidence merely showed that the
foster parents raised the child as their own."
In Taylor, the plaintiff sought a decree that she was the adopted daughter
of Walter Coberly (Coberly)5 ° The defendants were the collateral heirs of
Coberly.5 The plaintiff s natural mother died when the plaintiff was two weeks
old. 2 The plaintiff produced evidence that her natural father agreed that the
Coberlys were to take her and raise her as their own. 3 After taking the plaintiff,
the Coberlys gave her their own surname, referred to her as "our baby," placed
her in school, consented to her marriage, referred to the plaintiff s son as their
"grandson," remained in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and, at some
points, lived with the plaintiff and her husband until the Coberlys' death. There
44. See, e.g., Caraddock v. Johnson, 223 S.W. 924, 930 (Mo. 1920); Signaigo v.
Signaigo, 205 S.W. 23, 30-31 (Mo. 1918).
45. 15 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1929).
46. Id. at 824.
47. 38 S.W.2d 1055 (Mo. 1931).
48. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. For a case after Taylor displaying
the court inferring a contract for adoption based upon evidence which displayed little
more than a foster parent raising the child as his own, see Drake v. Drake, 43 S.W.2d 556
(Mo. 1931). Drake held that a contract for adoption existed based upon evidence that the
foster parent treated the child preferentially compared to his other stepchildren, gave the
child his surname, and intended to adopt the child. Id. at 560.
50. Taylor, 38 S.W.2d at 1056.
51. Id. at 1055.
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was evidence that the plaintiff referred to the Coberlys as "mama" and "papa,"
loved and obeyed the Coberlys, and cared for the Coberlys in their elderly
years. 4 The court summarized:
From the hour when as a baby but a few weeks of age [the plaintiff] had been
taken into [the Coberlys'] home until their death, her life had been inseparably
linked and interwoven in the lives of her foster parents in a relationship
marked by all the characteristics of parents and child.5s
After reciting the evidence, the court reviewed the doctrine of equitable
adoption. 6 After noting that the Coberlys had never formally adopted the
plaintiff, the court, relying on Lynn, indicated that a court of equity has
jurisdiction to enforce a parol contract of adoption and decree the child to be an
adopted child and an heir of the adopting parents where the child has fully
performed the contract and it would be inequitable to deny the adoption.57 The
court also held that the parol contract had to be supported by proof so clear,
cogent, and convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind of the
chancellor as to its existence. 8 Applying this test to the facts, the court decided
that the Coberlys' statements indicating that the Coberlys would take the child
if the natural father would give the child to them as their very own, combined
with the Coberlys' and the child's subsequent conduct, could be characterized
only as a relationship of parent and child and was strongly indicative of an
adoption contract. 9 The court further stated that there could be no doubt that the
plaintiff and the Coberlys fully performed the contract.60
After stating the contractual basis for affirming the decree of adoption, the
court relied on an estoppel basis for affirming the decree:
"Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby voluntarily
assuming the status of parent, and by reason thereof obtains from the child the
love, affection, companionship, and services which ordinarily accrue to a
parent," he, or those claiming through him will thereafter be "estopped to
assert that he did not adopt the child in the manner provided by law." If that
doctrine be applied to the facts in this case, clearly the plaintiff would be
entitled to a decree declaring her to be an adopted child of the Coberlys. The
judgment and decree of the court nisi is affirmed.6'
54. Id. at 1057-60.
55. Id. at 1059.
56. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
57. Taylor, 38 S.W.2d at 1060.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1061.
60. Id. at 1060.




Petri: Petri: What's in a Name--Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
202 MISSOURILA WREVIEW [Vol. 63
From Lynn to Taylor, the supreme court consistently had entered decrees
of equitable adoption when the evidence showed that the foster parents raised the
foster child as their own.62 After these cases, the court began to deny decrees of
equitable adoption even though the evidence displayed that the foster parents
raised the child as their own. The court, in making the latter decisions, did not
create any new precedent in equitable adoption, but rather found specific
evidence persuasive in showing that no contract to adopt existed or found that
the claimant of equitable adoption had not met the burden of proof. For
example, in Benjamin v. Cronan,63 the court was persuaded that the foster
parents had not entered a contract to adopt the plaintiff because the foster parents
had taken in a second child, whom they adopted using the statutory proceduresfr'
The court expressly refused to consider the theory of adoption by estoppel. 6'
B. The Courts Create Precedent Adverse to
Equitable Adoption Claimants
It was not long before the courts, in addition to denying decrees of equitable
adoption because the evidence was unconvincing, began to deny decrees of
equitable adoption by creating new precedent.
62. See supra notes 30-62 and accompanying text.
63. 93 S.W.2d 975 (Mo. 1936).
64. Id. at 981. One court reasoned that a plaintiff was not equitably adopted
because the purported equitably adoptive parents took a second child into their home at
approximately the same time as the plaintiff, and the parents executed a formal deed of
adoption for the second child but not for the plaintiff. Stillman v. Austin, 148 S.W.2d
573, 575 (Mo. 1941).
Several other courts have refused to order a decree of equitable adoption because
they either found no contract to adopt existed or found the claimant of equitable adoption
had not satisfied the burden of proof. Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 779 S.W.2d
647, 650 (Mo. 1989) (evidence that the foster father had testified under oath that the child
was his son and evidence that foster father had listed child as his dependent on his tax
forms found unpersuasive); Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964, 969 (Mo. 1947)
(decree of adoption denied because the foster parent knew the difference between a
contract and a formal adoption, yet only entered a contract, because the foster parent did
not mention the child as his adopted son in his will, and because foster parent was a man
of integrity who would have adopted the child if he so intended); Keller v. Lewis County,
134 S.W.2d 48,49 (Mo. 1941) (finding no adoption by contract or otherwise because the
foster parents had taken the plaintiff into custody pursuant to an apprenticeship indenture
and because the foster parents did not include the plaintiff in their will); Taylor v.
Hamrick, 134 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Mo. 1939) (foster father's testimony that the foster mother
intended to adopt the child, and the foster mother's life insurance policy referring to the
child as daughter were "meager" evidence which failed to measure up to the standard of
proof).
65. Benjamin, 93 S.W.2d at 981.
8
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In Thompson v. Moseley,66 the supreme court produced some of the most
straightforward precedent it has ever issued on equitable adoption when it held
that the doctrine of equitable adoption does not apply to enforce an oral contract
to adopt a person who was an adult at the time such oral contract was made. 7
According to the court, the fundamental basis of equitable adoption is that it
would be unjust to allow one to fail to comply with an agreement to be the
parent of a child when he has taken the child at such an age that the child had no
choice in the matter, and the child thereafter performs everything contemplated
in the adoptive relationship.68 Thus, the putative adoptive parent and his heirs
will be estopped to deny an adoption.69 In the court's words, "To depart from
this basis and apply the doctrine to an adult, who is capable of caring for himself
and contracting for himself, would greatly extend the doctrine and would surely
open the door to many fraudulent claims." '7
In Niehaus v. Madden," the court established new precedent that it would
use in many future cases to deny decrees of equitable adoption.72 In Niehaus, a
purported equitably adopted child (Niehaus) sought a declaration of adopted
status in order to share in the estate of the deceased (Mrs. Brock)."
The evidence in Niehaus was atypical.74 Niehaus was sixteen years old
when the Brocks took custody of her.7' She referred to the Brocks as "aunt" and
"uncle."76 The Brocks never referred to Niehaus as their daughter.77 Nine
months after being taken by the Brocks, Niehaus left them, moved to Little Rock
(the Brocks lived in St. Louis) and married without their consultation."
Evidence existed that the Brocks spoke of adopting Niehaus both before and
after they took custody of her, but the court denied the decree of equitable
adoption.79 The court spoke only of equitable adoption by oral contract and
stated:
[B]efore a decree for specific performance may be rendered in such a case
plaintiff must prove the existence of a contract to adopt. As in any other case,
plaintiff may make such proof by direct evidence of persons who heard the
66. 125 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. 1939).




71. 155 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1941).
72. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
73. Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d at 142.
74. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.




79. Id. at 146.
1998]
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contractual words spoken or saw them written. But plaintiff may also prove
the existence of the contract by circumstantial evidence, in which event the
circumstances must create a strong and certain inference that the contract was
made. They must be consistent with the fact to be proved and inconsistent with
any other reasonable hypothesis.8"
The court concluded that in the negotiation to take Niehaus from her legal
guardian, only Mr. Brock had agreed to adopt Niehaus."' The court held that
given the difficult burden of proof that Niehaus had to meet, she had not shown
that Mrs. Brock's actions after the Brocks took custody of her amounted to a
ratification of the contract.8 2 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's
denial of a decree of equitable adoption.83
The court consistently has used the Niehaus rubric to deny equitable
adoption by contract and by estoppel, particularly when the child is a stepchild
of the foster parent.' Furthermore, in 1991, the Missouri Court ofAppeals used
a derivation of the Niehaus reasoning in Birdwell v. Phillips. 5 Birdwell's
holding could be crippling to equitable adoption claimants if the case's
reasoning is extrapolated to different facts. In Birdwell, the purported equitably
adopted child (Birdwell) argued on appeal that the trial court had erred because
the evidence relied upon by the trial court was insufficient to deny the decree.86
The court, quoting Niehaus and its progeny, stated that the claimant of an
equitable adoption who relies solely on circumstantial evidence must produce
evidence "consistent only with the existence of equitable adoption and
inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis leaving nothing to
conjecture."87 However, the court used this principle in an unprecedented
fashion. Relying on the fact that Birdwell sometimes referred to his purported
equitable adoptive parents (the Webbs) as foster parents and the fact that
Birdwell received Social Security payments due to the death of his natural
father, the court concluded that the evidence was also consistent with the picture
80. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 145.
82. Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d at 143.
83. Id. at 146.
84. Several cases have denied an equitable adoption at least in part due to a finding
that the evidence was not consistent solely with adoption. See In re Van Cleave's Estate,
610 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. 1981); Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Mo. 1954);
Capps v. Adamson, 242 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Mo. 1951); Holland v. Martin, 198 S.W.2d 16,
18 (Mo. 1941) (first case applying the doctrine to adoption by estoppel); Birdwell v.
Phillips, 805 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank,
779 S.W.2d 647, 651, 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
85. 805 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
86. Id. at 220.
87. Id. at 221-22 (quoting Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 779 S.W.2d 647, 650
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
88. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 63
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of the Webbs as Birdwell's foster parents.89 Because the evidence was open to
this conjecture, the court denied the decree of equitable adoption.90
In addition to Niehaus and its progeny, the court has created other
precedent detrimental to equitable adoption claimants. In Rich v. Baer9' and
Capps v. Adamson,92 the court produced precedent particularly obstructive to
plaintiffs seeking decrees of equitable adoption by estoppel.
In Rich, evidence existed that the foster parents had raised the child as their
own.93 However, there were some critical differences between Rich and
previous cases.94 First, Rich was not a case in which the child sought an
equitable adoption decree against the collateral heirs of the deceased (Wyatt).
In Rich, Wyatt was suing the purported equitably adopted child (Baer) to set
aside a conveyance of real estate he had made to her.95 The grounds for Wyatt's
action were fraud and undue influence.96 Baer denied the fraud and undue
influence, but also counterclaimed for a decree of equitable adoption, apparently
in hopes of inheriting the property even if the conveyance was induced by fraud,
as Wyatt had died during the litigation. 7 Secondly, the Wyatts obtained custody
of Baer pursuant to a court order that had found Baer's natural parents grossly
immoral and not capable of caring for a child.98 Thirdly, Wyatt testified that he
never intended to adopt the child or told the child that he adopted her, but Baer
disputed this testimony.99 Finally, evidence existed that Baer ran away from
home, married a second and a third time without her putative parents' consent,
and that Baer's third husband cheated Wyatt in a business venture."
Despite Baer's testimony at trial that Wyatt had told her he was adopting
her, the court began its analysis by stating that Baer was not relying on any such
89. Birdwell, 805 S.W.2d at 222.
90. Id.
91. 238 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1951).
92. 242 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1951).
93. Rich, 238 S.W.2d at 409-10. The child was taken into the home of the purported
equitably adoptive parents, the Wyatts, at a young age. She was given the Wyatts'
surname. They referred to her as "our daughter" and the child referred to the Wyatts as
"Dad" and "Mother." The child was obedient and dutiful. The child remained with the
Wyatts until her first marriage, to which the Wyatts consented, and later returned to care
for Wyatts in their elderly years. Id.
94. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
95. Rich, 238 S.W.2d at 408.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 408-09.
98. Id. at 409.
99. Id. at 409. Because this was a case in which Wyatt brought the claim before
he died, it was a rare instance in which the testimony of the equitably adoptive parent was
on the record.
100. Id. at 409.
1998]
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alleged oral contract.'' Instead the court viewed Baer as relying upon equitable
adoption by estoppel. 2 Without citing any previous cases, the court held that
the claimant's burden of proof required evidence so clear, cogent, and
convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt in the chancellor's mind. This
standard applied not only in a case of equitable adoption by oral contract, but
also in a case of equitable adoption by estoppel.0 3
After stating the burden of proof, the court added a new element to a claim
of equitable adoption by estoppel.'O According to the court, previous cases,
such as Schelp and Taylor, had not stated the entire rule of equitable adoption
by estoppel.'0 5 Schelp and Taylor had established that a claimant of equitable
adoption by estoppel must show that the purported equitably adoptive parent had
taken the child into his own home, voluntarily assumed the status of a parent and
obtained from the child love, affection, companionship, and services which
ordinarily accrue to a parent. In addition to the above criteria, the Rich court
held that a court was not to enter a decree of equitable adoption, regardless of
whether the claimant sought it on contract or estoppel grounds, unless justice,
good faith, and equity require it."' 6 The court reasoned that if the Schelp rule
were the complete rule, equitable adoption would become a rule of law rather
than equity, which would leave the door wide open to fraud. 07
In applying its new test to the facts, the court noted that evidence that the
Wyatts referred to the child as "daughter," gave the child their surname, and told
her that she had been adopted were significant, but not determinative. 08 The
court then engaged in the very kind of reciprocal benefit analysis it refused to
undertake in Hockaday, stating, "The record abundantly establishes .... [Baer]
brought great satisfaction to the Wyatts .... But, on the other hand .... [Baer]
profited immeasurably from the relationship .... She accumulated .... money
and bonds ..., she had support, clothing, and many luxuries .... ."" Finally,
the court held, without further explanation, that the most favorable view of all
of Baer's evidence was not necessarily consistent with adoption alone, and the
101. Rich, 238 S.W.2d at 411.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
105. Rich, 238 S.W.2d at 411. The rule established in Schelp and Taylor was:
Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby voluntarily
assuming the status of parent, and by reason thereof obtains from the child the
love, affection, companionship, and services which ordinarily accrue to a
parent, he, or those claiming through him will thereafter be estopped to assert





109. Rich, 238 S.W.2d at 412.
[Vol. 63
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/11
EQUITABLE ADOPTION
facts did not present a situation where justice, equity, and good faith compelled
a decree of equitable adoption."'
Just six months after Rich, the court fortified and clarified the position it
took in Rich when it decided Capps v. Adamson."' In Capps, the deceased's
(Dr. Adamson) heirs sought a judgment that an alleged will of Dr. Adamson was
not his last will and testament."2 The heirs joined the purported equitably
adopted child (Bradbury) as a defendant.13 Bradbury was the daughter of Dr.
Adamson's wife by a previous marriage."' Bradbury presented evidence
showing that Dr. Adamson referred to Bradbury as his "daughter," gave her his
surname, enrolled her in a public school, referred to her children as
"grandchildren," and bought a life insurance policy naming the beneficiary as
Edna Bradbury, daughter of the insured."'
In its analysis the court did not wander from Rich. The court stated that it
would look at the evidence with "especial strictness" and would hesitate to rely
on testimony of ancient conversations about a contract to adopt in view of the
trial chancellor's contrary findings." 6 The court held that Bradbury's evidence
was significant, but not decisive, and that "while such facts and circumstances
[were] in hannony and consistent with the relationship of father and daughter,
such facts and circumstances [were] also in harmony and consistent with a
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship."'"17 The court thus rejected the adoption by
contract claim and then, unlike in Rich, explained why justice, equity, and good
faith did not require a decree of equitable adoption by estoppel in this case:
[T]here is no evidence of conduct of or benefit to Dr. Adamson growing out
of the relationship which in justice, equity, and good conscience should
preclude the denial of an equitable adoption. No doubt Dr. Adamson had
great pleasure in having the child [Bradbury] in his home .... But [Bradbury]
was also the recipient of great benefit by virtue of her relationship with Dr.
Adamson and as a member of his family .... the relationship and conduct of
Dr. Adamson and [Bradbury] were mutually beneficial. We believe the
evidence does not justify a finding of an adoption by estoppel."'
110. Id. at412-13. The court never stated exactly why this was not a case in which
justice, equity, and good faith required a decree of equitable adoption, but the court did
perform the reciprocal benefits analysis just before making its conclusion.
111. 242 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1951).
112. Id. at 558.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 560.
116. Id. The court stated the special strictness standard is generally the rule where
verbal evidence is issued in lieu of a writing required by the Statute of Frauds. Id.
117. Capps, 242 S.W.2d at 560.
118. Id. at 561.
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The courts have continued to use evidence of a mutually beneficial
relationship to deny decrees of equitable adoption." 9
C. Cases in Which the Courts Have Ordered
Decrees of Equitable Adoption
Clearly the courts' decisions since the early 1930s have been adverse to the
doctrine of equitable adoption; nevertheless, there have been a few appellate
orders of equitable adoption in the jurisprudence. The courts have ordered
decrees of equitable adoption when there is direct evidence of a contract in
which the parties to the contract specifically mentioned "adoption." Courts also
have ordered decrees of equitable adoption when the plaintiff has produced
evidence of an attempt to comply with the statutory adoption procedures.
Lukas v. Hays' is an example of a case in which the court ordered a decree
of equitable adoption based on direct testimony that the natural parent and foster
parent entered a contract specifically mentioning adoption.'' In Lukas, the
purported equitably adopted child (Lukas) sought a decree of equitable adoption
and was opposed by the deceased's (Hays) heirs.t2 In addition to evidence that
Hays raised Lukas as his own," Lukas presented her natural mother (Haizlip),
who testified that while discussing the situation with Mr. and Mrs. Hays on the
phone, Mr. and Mrs. Hays specifically said that they would take Lukas for the
purpose of adopting her and would make all the arrangements for adoption.'24
The defendants presented e',idence indicating that Mr. Hays did not want to
leave any of his estate directly to Lukas because Lukas married without the
consent of the Hayses.'25
119. See In re Van Cleave's Estate, 610 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. 1981); Hegger v.
Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81, 89-90 (Mo. 1957).
120. 283 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1955).
121. There are several cases in which the court ordered a decree of equitable
adoption based upon direct evidence of a contract to adopt, either by testimony or a
writing. See Long v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Mo. 1965) (contract to adopt and
equitable adoption decree based in part upon evidence that the foster parents stated that
they did not want to take the baby unless the natural father consented and signed the
adoption papers); Bland v. Buoy, 74 S.W.2d 612, 620 (Mo. 1934) (contract to adopt and
equitable adoption decree based in part upon orphanage's records which stated that foster
parent had taken the child for adoption).
122. Lukas, 283 S.W.2d at 563.
123. The court refused to recite the details of the evidence, but did mention that
from the day the child arrived in the Hays' home, she was held out as the Hays' daughter,
and that she was a dutiful, obedient, and loving child towards Mr. and Mrs. Hays. Id. at
564.
124. Id. at 563.
125. Id. at 564-65.
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Without citing previous cases, the court held that the standard of review for
the case was de novo because it was an equitable action.'26 The court indicated
that although it might ordinarily give some deference to the trial court's findings
even given the de novo standard, this was a case where the evidence consisted
mostly of documents and depositions; therefore, the court would give no
substantial deference to the findings of the trial court.127 The court stated the
burden of proof Lukas had to bear as it had in previous cases, but omitted the
language about leaving no reasonable doubt in the mind of the chancellor.128 In
the court's words, Lukas had the "burden of proving the agreement by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence.' 29 The court held that Haizlip's testimony
that Mr. and Mrs. Hays specifically said it was their purpose to adopt Lukas was
clear, cogent, and convincing proof that an oral agreement to adopt existed.'
Perhaps knowing what it was about to hold was inconsistent with, if not in
contradiction to, previous cases on equitable adoption, the court stated, "Each
case of this nature must, of necessity, be decided upon the facts and evidence
appearing therein. For that reason precedents may not be of much value in
determining the sufficiency of the proof.... After downplaying the value of
precedent, the court reversed the trial court and concluded that given the clear,
cogent and convincing evidence of the oral contract to adopt and full
performance by Haizlip, Lukas, and Mr. and Mrs. Hays (short of a formal, legal
adoption), equity and fairness required a decree of equitable adoption.12 The
court made this conclusion despite evidence of a mutually beneficial relationship
between Lukas and Mr. and Mrs. Hays, much like the relationship between Dr.
Adamson and Bradbury in Capps, and despite the evidence that Mr. Hays did
not want to leave any of his estate directly to Lukas.
In McCormick v. Johnson, the Missouri Court of Appeals ordered a decree
of equitable adoption when the evidence showed that the foster parents
attempted to comply with statutory adoption procedures.' In McCormick, the
purported equitably adopted child (Smith) sought a decree that he was the
adopted son of the deceased (McCormick)." McCormick's heirs opposed
Smith.'35 In addition to evidence showing that McCormick raised Smith as his
126. Id. at 565.
127. Id.
128. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
129. Lukas, 283 S.W.2d at 566.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 568.
132. Id.
133. 441 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
134. Id. at 725. See also Ahem v. Matthews, 85 S.W.2d 377, 384-85 (Mo. 1934)
(finding a deed of adoption and the statutory method of adoption at the time strongly
influential, and ordering a decree of equitable adoption).
135. McCormick, 441 S.W.2d at 725.
19981
15
Petri: Petri: What's in a Name--Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
own, 36 Smith presented the verified petition of McCormick and his wife to
adopt Smith and to change his surname to McCormick, which had been filed in
the Juvenile Court of the City of St. Louis in the year in which the McCormicks
had taken custody of Smith.'37 Smith, Smith's natural father, and George
McCormick had executed the petition, which stated each party's consent to the
adoption. 3 The court could not give the petition the effect of a statutory
adoption because the juvenile court had not entered a decree of adoption.'39
However, the court stated that the petition had strong evidentiary value of a
previous parol agreement to adopt. 40 The petition, combined with the other
circumstantial evidence, convinced the court that the parties had made an oral
agreement of adoption and that the parties had performed such agreement. 141
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decree of adoption. 142
In addition to the cases in which there is direct evidence of an explicit
agreement for adoption and cases where evidence exists that the foster parents
attempted to comply with the statutory adoption procedures, an anomalous case,
Mize v. Sims, 143 offers equitable adoption claimants favorable precedent. The
Missouri Court of Appeals had a factually rare case before it when it decided
Mize. The purported equitably adopted child (Mize) sought a decree that he was
the adopted child and heir of the deceased (Petty). 44 Petty's natural heirs
opposed Mize.145 In addition to evidence showing that Petty raised Mize as his
own child, 146 there was evidence that Petty was actually Mize's natural father
although Petty was not married to Mize's natural mother. 47 Despite the lack of
any evidence that at the time custody changed there was any specific mentioning
of adoption 41 or evidence of an attempt to comply with statutory adoption
136. Id. at 726. George McCormick and his wife gave William their surname,
referred to him as their son, and had a warm and close relationship with him. Id.
137. Id. at 726.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. McCormick, 441 S.W.2d at 726.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 727.
143. 516 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
144. Id. at 562.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 563. All of Mize's witnesses testified that a father and son relationship
existed between Petty and Mize. Petty referred to Mize as "my son" and Mize referred
to Petty as "daddy." Petty fulfilled the role of a father to Petty in all respects, providing
training, food, clothing, lodging, and education. Id.
147. Id. Witnesses testified that Mize's natural mother literally thrust Mize onto
Petty with the statement, "He is yours." Witnesses also testified that Petty made
statements such as "[e]verybody knows that is my boy," and "[I'm] having to raise...
[my] own blood." Id.
148. Mize, 516 S.W.2d at 564.
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procedures, the court entered a decree of equitable adoption based upon the oral
contract rationale. Using reasoning similar to Taylor and Hockaday's "actions
speak louder than words," the court stated, "[The] conduct and admissions of.
. Petty clearly and cogently delineate an agreement to adopt [Mize]."' 4 9 The
conduct of Petty which the court found persuasive included his informality (he
was the type of person who would not formally adopt even if he intended to
adopt), his belief and statements that Mize was his natural child, his admissions
that he intended to adopt Mize, his acceptance of the exclusive responsibility to
rear and educate Mize, the exceptional treatment of Mize compared to the
treatment of other children Petty sometimes allowed to stay at his house, and his
general treatment of Mize as his own child. 5° The court rejected the heirs'
argument that Petty needed to communicate to Mize that he had adopted Mize
so that Mize would detrimentally rely on Petty's assertions.15 Although the
basis of the court's opinion for the most part seemed to be equitable adoption by
oral contract, the court made comparisons to equitable adoption by estoppel
cases152 and closed with the following statement indicating equitable adoption
by estoppel: "[T]he evidence is sufficiently clear, cogent, and convincing...
that it would be inequitable to permit it to be asserted that [Mize] was not...
adopted." '
D. Other Equitable Adoption Issues
In addition to precedent regarding what an equitable adoption claimant
must show to obtain a decree of equitable adoption, the courts have produced
tributary precedent on equitable adoption. The court of appeals has held that the
doctrine of equitable adoption is meant to benefit only the child. 54 Thus, for
example, the equitably adoptive mother is precluded from intervening in the
natural father's wrongful death action for the death of the child, 55 and a third
party cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable adoption to bar a child from
inheriting from his natural parents after the child already has inherited from his
equitably adoptive parent. 56 Also, an equitably adopted child's natural sister
and brother will inherit from the estate of the equitably adopted child to the
exclusion of the equitably adoptive parents' relatives." 7 Although the court has
cautioned against expanding the doctrine of equitable adoption, the court has
149. Id. at 565.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 566.
152. Id. at 567.
153. Id.
154. Halterman v. Halterman, 867 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Gardner v. Hancock, 924 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
157. See, e.g., Rumans v. Lighthizer, 249 S.W.2d 397, 399-401 (Mo. 1952).
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held that an equitably adopted child can state a claim for wrongful death of his
adoptive parent.' Finally, the court has changed the standard of review in an
equitable adoption case. The trial court's denial of an equitable adoption decree
is to be sustained "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it
is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law or
unless it erroneously applies the law."'59
E. A Synthesis of Missouri Law
Because equitable adoption does not fit the orthodox contract or estoppel
'analysis," it is difficult to predict the outcome of cases. What makes the
outcomes even more difficult to predict is that sometimes it appears that the
Missouri courts do not mean what they say.' For example, in Lukas did the
child's natural grandmother's testimony that, when the transaction took place,
the foster parents said they were taking the child for the purposes of adoption
really prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a contract to adopt existed? And,
would justice, equity, and good faith require the decree of equitable adoption so
that the plaintiff could share in the estate when there was evidence that the foster
parents did not want the plaintiffto share in the estate?66 These questions are
even more curious considering that the standard of review in the case was de
novo. 164
Nevertheless, a comprehensive synthesis of the law is helpful in analyzing
an equitable adoption claim. The following is a series of questions and answers
representing a synthesis of Missouri law on equitable adoption claims:
1. Was the plaintiff an adult when the foster parents took him into
custody? If so, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim of equitable
adoption.16 If the plaintiff was not an adult at the time the foster parents
took him into custody, the plaintiff has two different theories of equitable
adoption he may plead: equitable adoption by contract and equitable
adoption by estoppel." Since equitable adoption by contract appears to be
the more commonly pleaded theory, 67 and the more successful theory for
158. See, e.g., Holt v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 685 S.W.2d 851, 856-58 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
159. In re Van Cleave's Estate, 610 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. 1981) (quoting Murphy
v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976)).
160. See infra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
162. Lukas v. Hayes, 283 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. 1955).
163. Id. at 564-65.
164. Id. at 565.
165. See Thompson v. Moseley, 125 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. 1939).
166. See supra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 29-154 and accompanying text.
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equitable adoption claimants,'68 the analysis will begin with equitable
adoption by contract.
2. Does the plaintiff have either direct evidence or other evidence which
the court has usually considered to be so clear, cogent, and convincing as
to leave no reasonable doubt169 that a prior contract to adopt existed?
Although the court has stated that the parties to the contract do not need to
use the word "adopt,""17 the court also has consistently ordered decrees of
equitable adoption when the plaintiff can offer a witness (or written
evidence) who testifies that the natural parents and the foster parents
entered an agreement actually mentioning the word "adopt." In Bland, the
orphanage which released the children to the foster parents documented the
transaction with the statement, "Taken by Mr. Bland ... for adoption.
'' 7
In Lukas, the child's natural grandmother testified that, while she was
discussing the transaction with the foster parents, the foster parents said
they were taking the child with the purpose of adopting her and would
make all the arrangements for adoption." In Long, the natural father's
sister-in-law testified that the foster parents took the child on the condition
that the natural father would consent and sign the adoption papers. In all
three cases, the court ordered equitable adoptions."
The court also has ordered equitable adoption when the plaintiff
produces evidence that the foster parents attempted to comply with the
statutory procedures for adoption. In both Ahern and McCormick, the
courts granted decrees of equitable adoption when the plaintiff showed the
foster parents had attempted to comply with the statutory procedures."
The courts in both cases indicated that the attempt at compliance was
strongly persuasive that a contract to adopt existed. 76
3. If the plaintiff does not have the kind of evidence referred to in
Question 2, can he still succeed on a claim of equitable adoption by
contract? Maybe. The court has not expressly overruled any of the
equitable adoption cases. Therefore, absent the evidence referred to above,
the plaintiff could still rely on older cases like Thompson and Drake or
168. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
169. Sometimes the court omits the "no reasonable doubt" language, but includes
the "clear, cogent, and convincing" language. See, e.g., Lukas v. Hayes, 283 S.W.2d 561,
566 (Mo. 1955).
170. Holland v. Martin, 198 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1946).
171. Bland v. Buoy, 74 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Mo. 1934).
172. Lukas v. Hayes, 283 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. 1955).
173. Long v. Willey, 391 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Mo. 1965).
174. Long, 391 S.W.2d at 305-06; Lukas, 283 S.W.2d at 568; Bland, 74 S.W.2d at
620.
175. Ahern v. Mathews, 85 S.W.2d 377, 385 (Mo. 1934); McCormick v. Johnson,
441 S.W.2d 724,727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
176. Ahern, 85 S.W.2d at 384-85; McCormick, 441 S.W.2d at 726.
1998]
19
Petri: Petri: What's in a Name--Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
anomalous cases such as Mize. Although the plaintiffs in these cases did
not show any direct evidence of a contract to adopt or any evidence of an
attempted compliance with statutory adoption procedures, the court ordered
decrees of equitable adoption." Taylor and Drake appear to be the last of
the cases from an era in which the act of the foster parents raising the
children as their own, standing by itself, was enough for the court to infer
a contract to adopt. However, in both cases there was something more. In
Taylor, before the foster parents took custody of the child, they represented
to some of the natural parents' relatives that they intended to take the child
and raise the child as their very own.178 In Drake, the foster parent treated
the child preferentially, compared to other children he had taken in at the
time.179
Mize appears to be an anomalous case. Mize occurred well after the
court had laid down the Niehaus precedent8 that absent direct evidence of
a contract to adopt, the plaintiff must show evidence that is only consistent
with equitable adoption and inconsistent with any other reasonable
hypothesis.' 8' However, in Mize, the court ordered an equitable adoption
absent such evidence.' The court seemed particularly influenced by the
foster parent's preferential treatment of the child compared to other
children the foster parent had taken in and the evidence that the foster
parent may have actually been the natural parent of the child.83
However, the plaintiff should not overestimate his chances of
succeeding without direct evidence of a contract to adopt or an attempt to
comply with statutory procedures. The modem and well-established
approach of the court is to deny orders of equitable adoption when such
evidence is absent."s The court is particularly harsh on stepchildren. The
court often invokes the Niehaus rubric in cases where the child could also
be considered a stepchild of the foster parent,"8 and the court now
177. Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1062 (Mo. 1931); Drake v. Drake, 43
S.W.2d 556, 561 (Mo. 1931).
178. Taylor, 38 S.W.2d at 1061.
179. Drake, 43 S.W.2d at 560.
180. Niehaus v. Madden, 155 S.W. 2d 141 (Mo. 1941); Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d
561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
181. Niehaus, 155 S.W.2d at 144.
182. Mize, 516 S.W.2d at 568.
183. Id. at 565.
184. See Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 779 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. 1989);
Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. 1954); Capps v. Adamson, 242 S.W.2d
556, 562 (Mo. 1951); Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964, 970 (Mo. 1947); Niehaus,
155 S.W.2d at 145; Holland v. Martin, 198 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1941); Keller v. Lewis
County, 134 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo. 1941); Benjamin v. Cronan, 93 S.W.2d 975, 981 (Mo.
1936).
185. See, e.g., Capps, 242 S.W.2d at 560.
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apparently requires that a stepchild show some indicia of an intent or
attempt to adopt to win an equitable adoption by contract claim.'86
A final issue that the plaintiff should be aware of in trying to present
evidence of a prior adoption contract is the use of the Niehaus reasoning in
Birdwell. In Birdwell, the court never mentioned whether the plaintiff was
seeking a decree of equitable adoption based on a contract or based on
estoppel. Nevertheless, in denying a decree of equitable adoption the court
reasoned that, although the Birdwells raised the child as their own, the
evidence was just as consistent with a foster parent-foster child situation." 7
Perhaps the case is merely one whose holding should be limited because
there was evidence that the child sometimes referred to the Birdwells as his
foster parents and received Social Security benefits due to the death of his
natural father.' 8 However, if the court's reasoning is extended, it would
seem, in every case in which the foster parents do not obtain an actual
statutory adoption, the evidence is at least reasonably consistent with a
foster.parent-foster child relationship.
4. Even if the plaintiff has clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of a
prior contract to adopt, what else does he need to show to gain a decree of
equitable adoption? The plaintiff has to show that the parties to the
contract fully performed the contract, except for the compliance with the
statutory procedures.'89 This issue, however, is usually not in dispute
because the elements are usually inherent to the filing of an equitable
adoption claim. In other words, if the child has not been placed in the
custody of foster parents (i.e., the natural parents have not performed), and
the foster parents have not raised the child as their own, and the child has
not been loyal to the foster parents (i.e., either the foster parents or the child
has not performed), then it seems doubtful that a dispute would even arise.
In Rich, the court indicated that regardless of whether the claimant
sought a decree on contract or estoppel grounds, justice, equity, and good
faith must require the order before the court can enter it. 9° Whether or not
this is a meaningful element of a contractual claim is difficult to determine.
Rich was an adoption by estoppel case, 19' so the court's statements about
the requirements for adoption by contract are dicta. After Rich, there has
186. See Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401,403 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996). However, in Weidner the court never explicitly stated whether Weidner
was relying on an adoption by contract or an adoption by estoppel theory.
187. Birdwell v. Phillips, 805 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Lukas v. Hayes, 283 S.W.2d at 561, 568 (Mo. 1955); Taylor v.
Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1060 (Mo. 1931); Lynn v. Hockaday, 61 S.W. 885, 888 (Mo.
1901).
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not been clear precedent on the issue in an adoption by contract case.9
Perhaps the justice, equity and good-faith element is inherent when the
court already has found that the foster parents and natural parents had a
contract. If the court already has found that there was a contract that the
child fully performed, it would always seem to be unjust to fail to enter the
decree of equitable adoption, as it would allow the foster parents to escape
the contract while the child and natural parents fulfilled it.
5. Besides arguing that the plaintiff has not met the high standard of
proof in an adoption by contract case, what are other promising arguments
that the defendant can make? Basically, the defendant should present any
kind of evidence he might have which shows that the foster parents did not
enter a contractual adoption or did not intend to adopt the plaintiff. In both
Benjamin and Stillman, the court refused to enter a decree of equitable
adoption when the foster parents had taken a second child into their home
at the same time they took the plaintiff and had adopted the second child
using the statutory procedures, but had not done so for the plaintiff.93
Also, the court has mentioned the foster parent's failure to adopt the child
(when such parent was the type of person who would have done so if he
intended) and the foster parent's exclusion of the plaintiff from his will as
factors indicating that there was no adoption contract. 94
6. If the plaintiff cannot obtain an equitable adoption decree using a prior
contract as his theory, how likely is it that the plaintiff can obtain the decree
using equitable adoption by estoppel? In short, very unlikely. There
appear to be at least two major problems for the plaintiff. One is the
inconsistency in the court's application of the doctrine. To understand the
inconsistency, the elements of the claim need to be examined closely.
Schelp and Taylor stated the essence of an adoption by estoppel claim as
the following:
Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby
voluntarily assuming the status of parent, and by reason thereof
obtains from the child the love, affection, companionship, and
services which ordinarily accrue to a parent, he, or those claiming
192. In Weidner, the court never stated whether the plaintiff was using adoption by
contract or by estoppel; however, the court seemed to merge the Niehaus language with
the justice, equity, and good-faith element when it stated, "When such cases [stepchild-
stepparent cases] yield evidence of only a close stepchild-stepparent relationship, justice,
equity, and good faith do not require a finding of adoption." Weidner v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401,403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
193. See Benjamin v. Cronan, 93 S.W.2d 975,981 (Mo. 1936); Stillman v. Austin,
148 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. 1936).
194. See, e.g., Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964, 969 (Mo. 1947).
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through him will thereafter be "estopped to assert that he did not
adopt the child in the manner provided by law."9'
Later, in Rich, the court added the justice, equity and good-faith
requirement. 6 However, the court has applied the element by denying
decrees of equitable adoption when there is evidence that the child
benefitted from the relationship just as the parent did.' 9 For example, in
Capps, the court, in performing the justice, equity and good-faith analysis,
stated:
[T]here is no evidence of conduct of or benefit to Dr. Adamson
growing out of the relationship which injustice, equity, and good
conscience should preclude the denial of an equitable adoption.
No doubt Dr. Adamson had great pleasure in having [Bradbury] in
his home .... But [Bradbury] was also the recipient of great
benefit by virtue of her relationship with Dr. Adamson and as a
member of his family .... the relationship and conduct of Dr.
Adamson and [Bradbury] were mutually beneficial. We believe
the evidence does not justify a finding of an adoption by
estoppel. 9 '
The inconsistency in the application is that the definition of equitable
adoption by estoppel seems to require a mutually beneficial relationship.
When one assumes the status of a parent, as the definition requires, his
conduct will almost certainly benefit the child. The definition also calls for
the foster parent to receive benefits from the child in the form of love,
companionship, and services. But it is this mutually beneficial relationship
which defeats the justice, equity and good-faith element and ultimately
defeats the claim of equitable adoption by estoppel.
Secondly, the court has applied the Niehaus rubric to adoption by
estoppel cases as well. For example, in Hogane, Van Cleave's Estate and
Bellinger the courts denied decrees of equitable adoption because the
plaintiff had not shown that the evidence was inconsistent with a stepchild-
stepparent relationship.'9 If the plaintiff truly has to show the evidence is
not consistent with any other theory, such as a good stepchild-stepparent
relationship or foster child-foster parent relationship, then it would seem
the plaintiff is going to have to show the kind of evidence the court has
195. Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1062 (Mo. 1931) (quoting Shelp v.
Mercantile Trust Co., 15 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Mo. 1929)).
196. Rich v. Baer, 238 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1951).
197. E.g., Hegger v. Kausler, 303 S.W.2d 81, 90 (Mo. 1957).
198. Capps v. Adamson, 242 S.W.2d 556, 561 (Mo. 1951).
199. In re Van Cleave's Estate, 610 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Mo. 1981); Hogane v.
Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 12-13 (Mo. 1954); Bellinger v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 779
S.W.2d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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found persuasive in adoption by contract cases. If this is the case, the
plaintiff would be better off pleading an adoption by contract case (of
course, only if he truly believed there was such a contract) to avoid the
problem with the justice, equity and good-faith element of equitable
adoption by estoppel.
Perhaps the best indicator of the plaintiff's chances of winning a claim
of equitable adoption by estoppel comes from a pragmatic analysis rather
than a doctrinal analysis. Of the sampled appellate cases, none granted an
equitable adoption exclusively upon an estoppel claim.
7. If the plaintiff loses upon either theory at trial, how likely is an appeal
based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to succeed? Again, not likely.
Van Cleave's Estate changed the standard of review in equitable adoption
cases to conform with Murphy: "The trial court's order in denial of the
decree of equitable adoption is to be sustained 'unless there is no
substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the
evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law or unless it erroneously
applies the law. ''' 200 When this level of appellate review is combined with
the plaintiff's burden of showing proof so clear, cogent, and convincing as
to leave no reasonable doubt that an adoption occurred, a plaintiff will have
to show that his evidence was so overwhelming that finding just a
reasonable doubt is against the great weight of the evidence.
F. Criticisms of Equitable Adoption
Scholars have criticized both the contract and estoppel rationales for the
doctrine of equitable adoption. 20 1 The contract rationale seems particularly
suspect.202 One problem with the contract rationale is that the child seems to
play inconsistent roles.03 The child acts as a primary party to the contract by
giving at least part of the consideration by performing services for the foster
parent. However, the child is also a third party beneficiary to the extent that, in
the usual case, the natural parents and the foster parents actually reach the
agreement for the benefit of the child, as the child is too young to strike such an
agreement himself.24 The notion of a unilateral contract in which the child's
living with the foster parents is seen as his acceptance of their offer to adopt also
is undermined by the child's being too young to know of any contract or to
understand its importance.205
200. In re Van Cleave's Estate, 610 S.W.2d at 622 (quoting Murphy v. Carron, 536
S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976)).
201. See infra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.
202. See Rein, supra note 2, at 772.
203. See Rein, supra note 2, at 772-73.
204. See Rein, supra note 2, at 773.
205. See Rein, supra note 2, at 775.
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Whether the child is a primary party to the contract or a third party
beneficiary, there is a question as to who has the legal authority to enter into
such an agreement.206 The courts seem implicitly to assume that the natural
parents or persons who are in loco parentis have such authority.2 7 Given that
most states have enacted regulations for the screening and approval of
prospective adopters, this assumed authority may be questionable.2 8
Although the estoppel theory may come closer to explaining cases than
does the contract analysis, the estoppel rationale also has its short-comings. 2 9
Equitable estoppel's fundamental elements are: "(1) a promise or representation
of a fact; (2) actual and reasonable reliance on the promise or representation; and
(3) resulting detriment."2 10 The two elements which are often absent in an
equitable adoption case are actual reliance and detriment.211 Cases often do not
specify whether the child needs to rely on an actual adoption contract or on the
representations that the foster parents are his true parents. However, even if the
child knew there was no contract to adopt or knew that his foster parents were
not his true parents, he would probably remain with his foster parents because
he has no other viable option.212 As to actual detriment in an economic sense,
it is difficult to show because the foster parents often have given the child a
home, an education, and other support that the biological parents could not have
provided.21
Given that the contract and estoppel underpinnings have to be stretched to
fit an equitable adoption case, courts and commentators have suggested
altemative tests.2 4 For example, the California Court of Appeals has held that
a plaintiff seeking an equitable adoption by estoppel vis-a-vis the putative father,
must show "that (1) the putative father represented to the child that he was his
father; (2) the child relied upon the representation by accepting and treating the
putative father as his father; (3) the child was ignorant of the true facts; and (4)
the representation was of such duration that it frustrated the realistic opportunity
to discover the natural father and to reestablish the child-parent relationship
between the child and the natural father."
215
206. See Rein, supra note 2, at 773.
207. See Rein, supra note 2, at 773.
208. See Rein, supra note 2, at 774.
209. See Rein, supra note 2, at 775-76.
210. See Rein, supra note 2, at 776.
211. See Rein, supra note 2, at 776.
212. See Rein, supra note 2. Rein notes that the real detrimental reliance in these
cases may be psychological. "Any child who grows up with the belief that he is a natural
child of the only parents he knows is bound to be distressed when he learns that society
views him as a legal stranger to his family." See Rein, supra note 2, at 778.
213. See Rein, supra note 2, at 778.
214. See infra notes 216-18.
215. In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38,41 (Ct. App. 1975).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has adopted a test which
focuses on whether the claimant can show his status is identical to that of a
formally adopted child. 16 One scholar, Professor Jan Ellen Rein, noting that the
contract requirement is artificial and malleable, has proposed a test which merely
asks whether the foster parent led the child to believe that he was the
biologically or legally adopted member of his foster family." 7
Scholars also have criticized the doctrine of equitable adoption on other
grounds.1 8 Some indicate that expanding the scope of equitable adoption would
detract from the importance of strict compliance with state adoption statutes, and
therefore praise cases which have limited the scope of equitable adoption. 29
Others have cited equitable adoption's particularly poor protection of
stepchildren's interests as one reason to incorporate stepchildren into intestacy
statutes.220 Finally, it has been argued that equitable adoption has become a
Pandora's box, emitting a plethora of perplexing questions such as: Can the
equitably adopted child inherit from the foster parent's blood relatives through
the foster parent? Can the equitably adopted child inherit from both his foster
and natural parents? And can the equitably adopted child recover workmen's




In Weidner, the court faced a situation in which a child's natural mother and
the natural mother's husband, who did not sire the child, raised the child.
However, the husband did not formally adopt the child.223
The court first gave a brief overview of adoption law and its intersection
with the doctrine of equitable adoption. 4 The court then reviewed several prior
216. Wheeler Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 373 (W. Va.
1978).
217. See Rein, supra note 2, at 786.
218. See infra notes 220-22. But see Christi Gill Baunach, The Role of Equitable
Adoption in a Mistaken Baby Switch, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 501, 513 (1993)
(praising the use of equitable adoption in a case where babies were given to the wrong
mothers).
219. Elizabeth A. Gaudio, Limiting the Scope of Equitable Adoption, 54 MD. L.
REV. 822, 831-33 (1995).
220. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 926-28 (1989).
221. See Rein, supra note 2, at 767-68. Rein gives numerous examples of such
questions.
222. Weidner v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 403. The court stated:
Prior to 1917, the only statutory method of adoption in this state was by deed.
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Missouri holdings before reaching the merits of the case.225 The court noted that
an equitably adopted child has the right to bring a wrongful death action for the
death of an equitably adoptive parent. 6 The court indicated that the judgment
of the trial court must be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to
support it, unless its verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, or unless
it erroneously declares or applies the law. 27 As a final preliminary matter
regarding the burden of proof, the court stated that a claimant of equitable
adoption must show "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence. In the case where
the claimant relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be
''consistent only with the existence of the equitable adoption and inconsistent
with any other reasonable hypothesis leaving nothing to conjecture. 22
Despite the trial court's ruling in favor of Weidner and the deferential
standard of review, the appellate court invoked the Niehaus doctrine. Weidner
produced no direct evidence that an oral contract to adopt existed. 9 As a result,
Weidner had to produce evidence "consistent only with the theory of equitable
adoption and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis leaving nothing
to conjecture."'  Furthermore, the decree of equitable adoption would be
granted only ifjustice, equity, and good faith required It.n1 The court then relied
on Drake and Capps in indicating that, in cases where a stepchild is seeking
equitable adoption from the stepparent, justice, equity, and good faith do not
require a finding of adoption unless there is evidence of more than a stepchild-
stepparent relationship, such as indicia of an intent or an attempt to adopt.232
While the court admitted that Lott and Weidner were close and that they referred
to each other as "father" and "daughter," the court also concluded that there was
considerable evidence that Lott did not intend to adopt Weidner, such as Lott's
failure to represent himself as Weidner's father in a name changing petition, his
failure to formally adopt Weidner, his listing of his sister as his closest relative
on his application for Veteran's benefits, his making no provision for Weidner
Menees v. Cowgill, 223 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Mo. 1949). Parents could transfer
or contract to adopt children. It was under these circumstances that the
doctrine of equitable adoption arose. When a promise to adopt had been
made, but the actual adoption had not occurred, a court of equity could
specifically enforce the contract or declare the parent estopped from denying
the adoption.
Id.
225. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.





231. Weidner, 928 S.W.2d at 403.
232. Id. This statement by the court combines the Niehaus precedent with the
justice, equity, and good-faith precedent.
1998]
27
Petri: Petri: What's in a Name--Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
in his estate, and his infrequent communication with Weidner after he retired.233
The court held that closeness in a relationship does not distinguish a relationship
from that of stepdaughter and stepfather and that there was no evidence
indicating that the relationship was anything more than a stepfather-stepdaughter
relationship.2 34 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court order
finding Weidner to have been equitably adopted by Lott. 35
In summary, Weidner is the most recent example of a court invoking the
Niehaus doctrine and the justice, equity, and good-faith analysis to deny a decree
of equitable adoption. What makes Weidner's holding unusual is that it
overturned the trial court despite the deferential standard of review.
V. COMMENT
Missouri courts should consider changing their approach to equitable
adoption claims. The contract and estoppel rationales are conceptually flawed
and have resulted in unfair decisions. For example, the court denied the plaintiff
a decree of equitable adoption in Holland when the evidence showed that the
foster parents raised and treated the child as their own for thirty-four years and
told him that they wanted him to inherit their property. 236 Yet, the plaintiff in
Lukas, whose foster parents raised her as their own, as in Holland, received a
decree of equitable adoption because of the plaintiffs natural grandmother's
testimony that the foster parents had said they were taking the child for
adoption.237 The plaintiff received the decree of equitable adoption despite
evidence that her foster parents did not want her to inherit their property.238
Even assuming that the grandmother in Lukas was telling the truth, should a
contract to adopt be so crucial to the outcome of the case when clearly the
contract rationale is specious?
The more difficult question is what the new standard should be. Should the
court have granted the Holland plaintiff a decree of equitable adoption or should
the court have denied the Lukas plaintiff a decree of equitable adoption? The
exact test Missouri courts should use in deciding on decrees of equitable
adoption is outside the scope of this Note. However, it does seem safe to
assume, at least in the context of claims for a share in the foster parent's estate,
that if a foster parent raises a child as his own and provides for the child
throughout his life, the foster parent's death would not change his intention that
the child be treated as his own. Therefore, a test more favorable to foster
children whose foster parents raised them as their own, such as West Virginia's
233. Id. at 404.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Holland v. Martin, 198 S.W.2d 16, 16-18 (Mo. 1946).
237. Lukas v. Hayes, 283 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. 1955).
238. Id. at 565.
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test, focusing on whether the claimant can show his status is identical to that of
a formally adopted child,239 or Rein's, which asks whether the foster parent led
the child to believe that he was the biologically or legally adopted member of his
foster family,24 should be considered in Missouri.
Moreover, the courts should consider different tests for equitable adoption
claims in different settings. The reasons that a foster child should be treated as
a natural child under the intestacy statutes are different than the reasons a foster
child should be treated as a natural child under a wrongful death statute, as the
statutes serve two different purposes.24' Weidner clearly was decided upon
Missouri precedent, but demonstrates a situation in which different tests might
be more appropriate. If the trial court's decision had stood, Weidner, who had
seen Lott only once in eleven years, would have had standing to bring a
wrongful death claim to the exclusion of other relatives of Lot.242 It seems
unsound that Weidner's standing to bring this action would have been based on
precedent developed almost exclusively in an intestacy or interpretation of wills
context. Perhaps this was an unstated reason for the standard of review not
being applied strictly.
Finally, even if the courts are not persuaded by the above observations, they
should at least remove the finding of a contract to adopt?43 as the crucial element
in an equitable adoption claim, because contractual analysis simply does not suit
equitable adoption. After all, the name of the doctrine is "equitable adoption."
VI. CONCLUSION
The sturdiness of equitable adoption's theoretical contract and estoppel
bases are suspect.2" Thus, as one might expect, the Missouri case law in the
area has not been uniform. From the late 1800s to the early 1900s the courts
often inferred contracts to adopt from the fact that foster parents had raised
children as their own.245 However, since that time, the courts have been much
less likely to find that there was a contract of adoption unless the plaintiff shows
direct evidence of such a contract or an attempted compliance with statutory
procedures. 246 If the plaintiff does not have such evidence, his hopes of winning
239. Wheeler Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978).
240. See Rein, supra note 2, at 786.
241. Presumably, the purpose of an intestacy statute is to carry out the intent of the
average decedent who does not leave a will. The purpose of a wrongful death statute is
to provide standing to a person who can bring a claim against the defendant on behalf of
the decedent.
242. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1994).
243. Adoption by estoppel is nearly extinct, at least at the appellate level. See
supra notes 196-200.
244. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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a case based solely on an estoppel argument almost certainly are in vain. This
is because the court has held that when a mutually beneficial relationship exists
between the foster parent and foster child, which will almost always be the case
in a foster child-foster parent relationship, justice, equity, and good faith do not
require a decree of equitable adoption.247 Unfortunately, Missouri's approach
has resulted in inequitable decisions. Therefore, Missouri courts should consider
changing their approach to equitable adoption.
CHRISTOPHER J. PEMI
247. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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